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The well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle arises from the empirical regularity that, among developed
country pairs, the high interest rate country tends to have high expected returns on its short term assets.
At the same time, another strand of the literature has documented that high real interest rate countries
tend to have currencies that are strong in real terms – indeed, stronger than can be accounted for by
the path of expected real interest differentials under uncovered interest parity.  These two strands –
one concerning short-run expected changes and the other concerning the level of the real exchange
rate – have apparently contradictory implications for the relationship of the foreign exchange risk premium
and interest-rate differentials.  This paper documents the puzzle, and shows that existing models appear
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cengel@ssc.wisc.edu  This study concerns two prominent empirical findings in international finance that have achieved 
almost folkloric status.  The interest parity puzzle in foreign exchange markets finds that over short time 
horizons (from a week to a quarter) when the interest rate (one country relative to another) is higher than 
average, the securities of the high-interest rate currency tend to earn an excess return.  That is, the high 
interest rate country tends to have the higher expected return in the short run.  A risk-based explanation of 
this anomaly requires that the securities in the high-interest rate country are relatively riskier, and 
therefore incorporate an excess return as a reward for risk-bearing. 
  The second stylized fact concerns evidence that when a country’s relative real interest rate rises 
above its average, its currency in levels tends to be stronger than average in real terms.  Moreover, the 
strength of the currency tends to be greater than is warranted by rational expectations of future short-term 
real interest differentials.  One way to rationalize this finding is to appeal to the influence of expected 
future risk premiums on the level of the exchange rate.  That is, the country with the relatively high real 
interest rate has the lower risk premium and hence the stronger currency.  When a country’s real interest 
rate rises, its currency appreciates not only because its assets pay a higher interest rate but also because 
they are less risky. 
  This paper produces evidence that confirms these empirical regularities for the exchange rates of 
the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.K.) relative to the U.S.  However, 
these findings, taken together, constitute a previously unrecognized puzzle regarding how cumulative 
excess returns or foreign exchange risk premiums affect the level of the real exchange rate.  Theoretically, 
a currency whose assets are perceived to be risky not only currently but looking forward to the distant 
future should be weaker, ceteris paribus.  The evidence cited implies that when a country’s relative real 
interest rate is high, the country’s securities are expected to yield an excess return over foreign securities 
in the short run; but, because the high-interest rate currency tends to be stronger, over longer horizons it is 
the foreign asset that is expected to yield an excess return.  This behavior of excess returns in the foreign 
exchange market poses a challenge for conventional theories of the foreign exchange risk premium.   
In brief, when one country’s interest rate is high, its currency tends to be stronger than average in 
real terms, it tends to keep appreciating for awhile, and then depreciates back toward its long-run value.  
But leading models of the forward-premium anomaly do not account for the behavior of the level of the 
real exchange rate: they predict that the high-interest rate currency will be weaker than average in real 
terms and appreciate over both the short- and long-run.  A risk-based explanation for the empirical 
regularities requires a reversal of the risk premium – the securities of the high-interest rate country must 
be relatively riskier in the short-run, but expected to be less risky than the other country’s securities in the 
more distant future.    
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Figure 1, which will be explained in detail later, illustrates the point dramatically.  The chart plots 
estimates based on a vector autoregression for the U.S. relative to data constructed as a weighted average 
of the other G7 countries.  The line labeled bQj shows the estimates of the slope coefficient of a 
regression of the real exchange rate in period t+j on the U.S.-Foreign real interest differential in period t.  
When the U.S. real interest rate is relatively high, the dollar tends to be strong in real terms (the real 
exchange rate is below its long run mean.)  Over the ensuing months, in the short run, the dollar on 
average appreciates even more when the U.S. real interest rate is high, before depreciating back toward its 
long-run mean.  The other two lines in the chart represent hypothetical behavior of the real exchange rate 
implied under two different models.  The line labeled bRj shows how the real exchange rate would 
behave if uncovered interest parity held (based on the VAR forecasts of future real interest differentials.)  
Relative to the interest parity norm, the actual real exchange rate behavior is notably different: when the 
U.S. real interest rate is high, (1) the real value of the dollar (in levels) is stronger than implied by interest 
parity (the real exchange rate is lower); (2) the dollar continues to appreciate in the short run (while 
interest parity implies a depreciation.)  The line labeled Model illustrates the implied behavior of the real 
exchange rate in a class of models based on risk averse behavior of representative agents in each 
economy.  These models have been developed to account for the uncovered interest parity puzzle – the 
subsequent short-run depreciation of the currency that tends to accompany a relatively high Home interest 
rate.  Referring to the line labeled bQj, the models are built to explain the initial negative slope of the line.  
However, the models miss the overall picture badly, because they predict the effect of interest rates on the 
level of real exchange rates with the wrong sign and therefore get the subsequent dynamics wrong as 
well.
1 
  The literature on the forward premium anomaly is vast.  Classic early references include Bilson 
(1981) and Fama (1984).  Engel (1996) surveys the early work that establishes this puzzle, and discusses 
the problems faced by the literature that tries to account for the regularity.  There have been many recent 
important contributions, including prominent papers by Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2002), Lustig and 
Verdelhan (2007), Burnside et. al. (2010a, 2010b), Verdelhan (2010), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010), 
Backus et. al. (2010).  Below, we survey the implications of the recent theoretical work for real exchange 
rate behavior. 
  Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979) are the original papers to draw the link between real 
interest rates and the level of the real exchange rate in the modern, asset-market approach to exchange 
rates.  The connection has not gone unchallenged, principally because the persistence of real exchange 
                                                 
1   The models referred to here tend to treat the real exchange rate as nonstationary, in contrast to the evidence we 
present in section 2.  As explained below, the line in Figure 2 refers to the model’s prediction for the stationary 
component of the real exchange rate.  
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rates and real interest differentials makes it difficult to establish their comovement with a high degree of 
uncertainty.  For example, Meese and Rogoff (1988) and Edison and Pauls (1993) treat both series as 
non-stationary and conclude that evidence in favor of cointegration is weak.  However, more recent work 
that examines the link between real interest rates and the real exchange rate, such as Engel and West 
(2006), Alquist and Chinn (2008), and Mark (2009), has tended to reestablish evidence of the empirical 
link.  Another approach connects surprise changes in real interest rates to unexpected changes in the real 
exchange rate.  There appears to be a strong link of the real exchange rate to news that alters the expected 
real interest differential – see, for example, Faust et. al. (2007), Andersen et. al. (2007) and Clarida and 
Waldman (2008).  
  The behavior of exchange rates and interest rates described here is closely associated with the 
notion of “delayed overshooting”.  The term was coined by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), but is used to 
describe a hypothesis first put forward by Froot and Thaler (1990).  Froot and Thaler’s explanation of the 
forward premium anomaly was that when, for example, the Home interest rate rises, the currency 
appreciates as it would in a model of interest parity such as Dornbusch’s (1976) classic paper.  But they 
hypothesize that the full reaction of the market is delayed, perhaps because some investors are slow to 
react to changes in interest rates, so that the currency keeps on appreciating in the months immediately 
following the interest rate increase.  Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) build a model based on this 
intuition.  Much of the empirical literature that has documented the phenomenon of delayed overshooting 
has focused on the response of exchange rates to identified monetary policy shocks.
2  But in the original 
context, the story was meant to apply to any shock that leads to an increase in relative interest rates.  Risk-
based explanations of the interest parity puzzle have not confronted this literature’s finding that high 
interest rate currencies are strong currencies.  Our empirical findings are consistent with Froot and 
Thaler’s hypothesis of delayed overshooting, but with one important modification.  The empirical 
methods here allow us to uncover what the level of the real exchange rate would be if uncovered interest 
parity held, and to compare the actual real exchange rate with this notional level.  We find the level of the 
real exchange rate is excessively sensitive to real interest differentials.  That is, when a country’s real 
interest rate increases, its currency appreciates more than it would under uncovered interest parity.  Then 
it continues to appreciate for a number of months, before slowly depreciating back to its long run level. 
  Section 1 develops the approach of this paper.  Section 2 presents empirical results.  Section 3 
develops some general conditions that have to be satisfied in order to account for our empirical findings.  
We discuss the difficulties encountered by representative agent models of the risk premium, and illustrate 
the problem by showing that some recent models based on non-standard preferences are unable to match 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), Scholl and 
Uhlig (2008), and Bjornland (2009).   
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the key facts we develop.
3  In section 4, we consider various caveats to our findings.  Finally, in the 
concluding section, we discuss some alternative models that may be able to account for these empirical 
regularities.  
  
1.  Excess Returns and Real Exchange Rates 
  We develop here a framework for examining behavior of excess returns and the level of the real 
exchange rate.  We relate the concepts here to economic theories of risk and return in section 3. 
  Our set-up will consider a Home and Foreign country.  In the empirical work of section 2, we 
always take the US as the Home country (as does the vast majority of the literature), and consider other 
major economies as the Foreign country.  Let  t i  be the one period nominal interest in Home.  We denote 
Foreign variables throughout with a superscript *, so 
*
t i  is the Foreign interest rate.   t s  denotes the log of 
the foreign exchange rate, expressed as the Home currency price of Foreign currency.   1 tt E s   refers to the 
expectation, conditional on time t information, of the log of the spot exchange rate at time  1 t  .  We 
define the “excess return”,  t  , as: 
(1) 
*
1 tt t t tt iE s si     . 
  This definition of excess returns corresponds with the definition in the literature.  We can 
interpret 
*
1 tt t t iE s s    as a first-order log approximation of the expected return in Home currency terms 
for a Foreign security.  As Engel (1996) notes, the first-order log approximation may not really be 
adequate for appreciating the implications of economic theories of the excess return.  For example, if the 
exchange rate is conditionally log normally distributed, then   
1
11 1 2 ln ( / ) var ( ) tt t t t t t t E SS E s s s     , 
where  1 var ( ) tt s   refers to the conditional variance of the log of the exchange rate.  Engel (1996) points 
out that this second-order term is approximately the same order of magnitude as the risk premiums 
implied by some economic models.  However, we proceed with analysis of  t   defined according to 
equation (1) both because it is the object of almost all of the empirical analysis of excess returns in 
foreign exchange markets, and because the theoretical literature that we consider in section 3 seeks to 
explain  t   as defined above including possible movements in  1 var ( ) tt s  . 
  The well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle comes from the empirical finding that the 
change in the log of the exchange rate is negatively correlated with the Home less Foreign interest 
differential, 
*
tt ii  .  That is, estimates of 
**
11 cov( , ) cov( , ) tt t t t tt t t s si i E s si i      tend to be negative.  
                                                 
3  “Representative agent models” may be an inadequate label for models of the risk premium that are developed off 
of the Euler equation of a representative agent under complete markets, generally taking the consumption stream as 
exogenous.  
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As Engel (1996) surveys, and subsequent empirical work confirms, this finding is consistent over time 
among pairs of high-income, low-inflation countries.
4  From equation (1), we note that the relationship 
*
1 cov( , ) 0 tt t t t Es s i i     is equivalent to 
** cov( , ) var( ) 0 tt t t t ii ii      .  That is, when the Home 
interest rate is relatively high, so 
*
tt ii   is above average, the excess return on Home assets also tends to 
be above average:  t   is below average.  This is considered a puzzle because it has been very difficult to 
find plausible economic models that can account for this relationship. 
 Let  t p  denote the log of the consumer price index at Home, and  11 ttt p p      is the inflation 
rate.  The log of the real exchange rate is defined as 
*
tt t t qspp   .  The ex ante real one-period interest 
rates, Home and Foreign, are given by  1 tt t t riE      and 
** *
1 tt t t riE    .  Note also 
*
111 1 tt t tt t tt tt Eq q Es s E E        .  We can rewrite (1) as: 
(2) 
*
1 tt t t t t rrE q q     . 
We take as uncontroversial the proposition that the real interest differential, 
*
tt rr  , and excess returns, 
t  , are stationary random variables without time trends, and denote their means as r  and  , 
respectively.  We will also stipulate that there is no deterministic time trend or drift in the log of real 
exchange rates, so that the unconditional mean of  1 tt t E qq    is zero.  Rewriting (2): 
(3) 
*
1 () ( ) tt t t t t qE q rrr          . 
  Iterate equation (3) forward, applying the law of iterated expectations, to get: 





() tt t j t j
j




   , and 
(6) 
0






   . 
We label  t R  as the “prospective real interest differential”.  It is the expected sum of the current 
and all future values of the Home less Foreign real interest differential (relative to its unconditional 
mean).  It is important to note that  t R  is not the real interest differential on long-term bonds, even 
hypothetical infinite-horizon bonds.   t R  is the difference between the real return from holding an infinite 
sequence of short-term Home bonds and the real return from the infinite sequence of short-term Foreign 
                                                 
4   Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) find that the relationship is not as consistent among emerging market countries, 
especially those with high inflation.  
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bonds.  An investment that involves rolling over short term assets has different risk characteristics than 
holding a long-term asset.  Hence we coin the phrase “prospective” real interest differential to avoid the 
trap of calling  t R  the long-term real interest differential. 
Similarly,  t   is the expected infinite sum of excess returns on the Foreign security.  We label this 
the “level excess return” or “level risk premium”, to make reference to its influence on the level of the 
real exchange rate. 
The left-hand side of (4),    lim tt t j j qE q    , can be interpreted as the transitory component of the 
real exchange rate.  In fact, according to our empirical findings reported in section 2, we can treat the real 
exchange rate as a stationary variable, so    lim ttj j E qq    .  As is well known, even if the real exchange 
rate is stationary, it is very persistent.  Engel (2000), in fact, argues that it may be practically impossible 
to distinguish between the stationary case and the unit root case under plausible economic conditions.  We 
proceed in examining  t qq  , assuming stationarity, but note that our methods could be applied to the 
transitory component of the real exchange rate, taken as the difference between  t q  and a measure of the 
permanent component,    lim ttj j Eq  .  In section 4, we note how Engel’s (2000) interpretation implies that 
in practice it may not be possible to distinguish a permanent and transitory component, but make the case 
that the economic analysis of that paper argues for treating the real exchange rate as stationary. 
In section 3, we discuss the common assumption in theoretical models of excess returns that the 
real exchange rate is equal to the difference between the marginal utility of a  Home consumer and 
Foreign consumer.  Stationarity of the real exchange rate is completely compatible with a unit root in the 
log of consumption, or in the marginal utility of consumption.  It requires simply that Home and Foreign 
marginal utilities of consumption be cointegrated, which is a natural condition among well-integrated 
economies such as the highly developed countries used in this study.  It is analogous to the assumption 
made in almost all closed-economy models that we can treat the marginal utilities of different consumers 
within a country as cointegrated.   
Under the stationarity assumption, we can write (4) as: 
(7)  tt t qq R    . 
From this formulation, we see that the level excess return,  t  , captures the potential effect of risk 
premiums on the level of the real exchange rate, holding the prospective real interest differential constant. 
  In the next section, we present evidence that 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t Rr r    and 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr  .  Taken 
together, these two findings imply from (7) that 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t qr r   , which jibes with the concept familiar 
from Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979) that when a country’s real interest rate is high (relative to the  
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foreign real interest rate, relative to average), its currency tends to be strong in real terms (relative to 
average.)  But if 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr  , the strength of the currency cannot be attributed entirely to the 
prospective real interest differential, as it would be in Dornbusch and Frankel (who both assume 
uncovered interest parity, or that  0 t   .)  The relationship between excess returns and real interest 
differential plays a role in determining the relation between the real exchange rate and real interest rates. 
  It is entirely unsurprising that we find 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t Rr r   .  This simply implies that there is not a 
great deal of non-monotonicity in the adjustment of real interest rates toward the long run mean. 
The central puzzle raised by this paper concerns the two findings, 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr    and 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr  .  The short-run excess return on the Foreign security,  t  , is negatively correlated with 
the real interest differential, consistent with the many empirical papers on the uncovered interest parity 
puzzle.  But the level excess return,  t  , is positively correlated.  Given the definition of  t   in equation 
(6), we must have that for at least  0 j   and possibly for some  0 j  , 
* cov( , ) 0 ttj t t Er r    , but for 
other 0 j  , 
* cov( , ) 0 ttj t t Er r    .  The sum of the latter covariances must exceed the sum of the former 
to generate 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr  .  As we discuss in section 3, our risk premium models of excess return are 
not up to the task of explaining this finding.  In fact, while they are constructed to account for 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr   , they have the counterfactual implication that 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr   .   
The empirical approach of this paper can be described simply.  We estimate VARs in the 
variables  t q , 
*
tt ii  , and 
**
11 () tt t t ii     .  From the VAR estimates, we construct measures of 
 
** *
11 () tt t t t t t E ii rr     .  Using standard projection formulas, we can also construct estimates of 
t R .  To measure  t  , we take the difference of  t qq   and  t R .  From these VAR estimates, we calculate 
our estimates of the covariances just discussed.  As an alternative approach, we estimate VARs in  t q , 
*
tt ii  , and 
*
tt    , and then construct the needed estimates of 
*
tt rr  ,  t R , and  t  .  The estimated 
covariances under this alternative approach are very similar to those from the original VAR.  Our 
approach of estimating undiscounted expected present values of interest rates from VARs is presaged in 
Mark (2009) and Brunnermeier et. al. (2009). 
 
2.  Empirical Results 
  We investigate the behavior of real exchange rates and interest rates for the U.S. relative to the 
other six countries of the G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.  We also consider the 
behavior of U.S. variables relative to an aggregate weighted average of the variables from these six  
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countries.
5  Our study uses monthly data.  Foreign exchange rates are noon buying rates in New York, on 
the last trading day of each month, culled from the daily data reported in the Federal Reserve historical 
database.  The price levels are consumer price indexes from the Main Economic Indicators on the OECD 
database.  Nominal interest rates are taken from the last trading day of the month, and are the midpoint of 
bid and offer rates for one-month Eurorates, as reported on Intercapital from Datastream.  The interest 
rate data begin in June 1979.  Most of our empirical work uses the time period June 1979 to October 
2009.  In some of the tests for a unit root in real exchange rates, reported in the Appendix, we use a longer 
time span from June 1973 to October 2009.  It is important for our purposes to include these data well 
into 2009 because it has been noted in some recent papers that there was a crash in the “carry trade” in 
2008, so it would perhaps bias our findings if our sample ended prior to this crash.
6  We treat the real 
exchange rates as stationary throughout our empirical analysis.   
  The Appendix details evidence that allows us to reject a unit root in real exchange rates.  It is well 
known that real exchange rates among advanced countries are very persistent.
7  There is no consensus on 
whether these real exchange rates are stationary or have a unit root.  Two recent studies of uncovered 
interest parity, Mark (2010) and Brunnermeier, et. al. (2009) estimate statistical models that assume the 
real exchange rate is stationary, but do not test for a unit root.  Jordà and Taylor (2010) demonstrate that 
there is a profitable carry-trade strategy that exploits the uncovered interest parity puzzle when the trading 
rule is enhanced by including a forecast that the real exchange rate will return to its long-run level when 
its deviations from the mean are large.  That paper assumes a stationary real exchange rate and includes 
statistical tests that cannot reject cointegration of  t s  with 
*
tt p p  .   
 
2.1 Fama regressions 
  Table 1 reports results from the standard “Fama regression” that is the basis for the forward 
premium puzzle.  The change in the log of the exchange rate between time t+1 and t is regressed on the 
time t interest differential: 
(8) 
*
1, 1 () tt s s t ts t s si i u       . 
Under uncovered interest parity,  0 s    and  1 s   .  
  We can rewrite this regression as: 
 
**
1, 1 () ( 1 ) ( ) ttt t s s t t s t iis s i iu         . 
                                                 
5 The weights are determined by the value of each country’s exports and imports as a fraction of the average value of 
trade over the six countries.   
6 See, for example, Brunnermeier, et. al. (2009) and Jordà and Taylor (2009). 
7 See Rogoff (1996) for example.  
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The left-hand side of the regression is the ex post excess return on the home security.  If  0 s    but 
1 s   , then the high-interest rate currency tends to have a higher excess return.  There is a positive 
correlation between the excess return on the Home currency and the Home-Foreign interest differential. 
The Table reports the 90% confidence interval for the regression coefficients, based on Newey-
West standard errors.  For five of the six currencies, the point estimate of  s   is negative (Italy being the 
exception).  Of those five, the 90% confidence interval for  s   lies below one for four (France being the 
exception, where the confidence interval barely includes one.)  For four of the six, zero is inside the 90% 
confidence interval for  s  .  (In the case of the U.K., the confidence interval barely excludes zero, while 
for Japan we find strong evidence that  s   is greater than zero.) 
The G6 exchange rate (the weighted average exchange rate, defined in the data section) appears 
to be less noisy than the individual exchange rates.  In all of our tests, the standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates are smaller for the G6 exchange rate than for the individual country exchange rates, 
suggesting that some idiosyncratic movements in country exchange rates get smoothed out when we look 
at averages.  Table 1 reports that the 90% confidence interval for this exchange rate lies well below one, 
with a point estimate of -1.467.
8     
 
2.2  Fama regressions in real terms 
  The Fama regression in real terms can be written as: 
(9) 
*
1, 1 ˆˆ () tt q q t tq t qq r ru      . 
  In this regression, 
* ˆˆ tt rr    refers to estimates of the ex ante real interest rate differential, 
** *
11 () tt t t t t t t rr iE i E      .  We estimate the real interest rate from VARs.  As noted above, we 
consider two different VAR models.  Model 1 is a VAR with 3 lags in the variables  t q , 
*
tt ii  , and 
**
11 () tt t t ii     .  From the VAR estimates, we construct measures of 
 
** *
11 () tt t t t t t E ii rr     .  Model 2 is a 3-lag VAR in  t q , 
*
tt ii  , and 
*
tt    . 
  There are two senses in which our measures of 
* ˆˆ tt rr   are estimates.  The first is that the 
parameters of the VAR are estimated.  But even if the parameters were known with certainty, we would 
still only have estimates of 
*
tt rr   because we are basing our measures of  
*
tt rr   on linear projections.  
Agents certainly have more sophisticated methods of calculating expectations, and use more information 
than is contained in our VAR. 
                                                 
8 The intercept coefficient, on the other hand is very near zero, and the 90% confidence interval easily contains zero.  
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The findings for the Fama regression in real terms are similar to those when the regression is 
estimated on nominal variables.  For four of the six currencies, the estimates of  q  , reported in Table 2A, 
are negative, and all are less than one.  In addition, the estimated coefficient for the G6 aggregate is close 
to -1.  This summary is true for both VAR models.  
  Table 2A reports three sets of confidence intervals.  All of the subsequent tables also report three 
sets of confidence intervals for each parameter estimate.  The first is based on Newey-West standard 
errors, ignoring the fact that 
* ˆˆ tt rr   is a generated regressor.  The second two are based on bootstraps.  
The first bootstrap uses percentile intervals and the second percentile-t intervals.
9 
  From Table 2A, all three sets of confidence intervals are similar.  For the individual currencies, 
for both Model 1 and Model 2, the confidence interval for  q   lies below one for Germany, Japan, and the 
U.K.  It contains one for Canada and Italy, and contains one for France except using the second 
confidence interval. 
  The findings are clear using the G6 average exchange rate: the coefficient estimate is  0.93   
when the real interest estimate comes from Model 1, and  0.91   when Model 2 is used.  All of the 
confidence intervals lie below one, though they all contain zero.  For both models, the estimate of  q   is 
very close to zero, and all confidence intervals contain zero. 
  In summary, the evidence on the interest parity puzzle is similar in real terms as in nominal terms.  
The estimate of the coefficient  q  , tends to be negative and there is strong evidence that it is less than 
one.  Even in real terms, the country with the higher interest rate tends to have short-run excess returns 
(i.e., excess returns and the interest rate differential are positively correlated.) 
  The Fama regression finds a strong negative correlation between  1 tt s s    and 
*
tt ii  .  It is well 
known that for the currencies of low-inflation, high-income countries,  1 tt s s    is highly correlated with 
1 tt qq   , which suggests  1 tt qq    is negatively correlated with 
*
tt ii  .  Since 
** *
11 () tt t t t t ii rr E      , for exploratory reasons we consider a regression of  1 tt qq    on 
* ˆˆ tt rr   and 
*
11 ˆ () tt t E    , where the latter is our measure of the expected inflation differential generated from the 
VARs.  These regressions are reported in Table 2B.  Specifically, Table 2B reports the estimation of: 
(10) 
**
11 2 1 1 , 1 ˆ ˆˆ () ( ) tt q q t t q t tt q t qq r r E u             . 
  The estimates of  1 q   tend to be negative, and generally more negative than those reported in 
Table 2A for equation (9).  The real surprise from Table 2B is that the estimates of  2 q   are negative for 
                                                 
9 See Hansen (2010).  The Appendix describes the bootstraps in more detail.  
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all currencies in both models.  Though they are not always significantly negative individually, and we do 
not calculate a test of their joint significance, it is nonetheless telling that all of the coefficient estimates 
are negative.  This implies that the currency of the country that is expected to have relatively high 
inflation is expected to appreciate in real terms.  We return to this finding in section 5. 
 
2.3  The real exchange rate, real interest rates, and the level risk premium 
  Table 3 reports estimates from  
(11) 
*
, ˆˆ () tqq t t q t qr r u   . 
In all cases (all currencies, for both Model 1 and Model 2), the coefficient estimate is negative.  In 
virtually all cases, although the confidence intervals are wide, the coefficient is significantly negative.
10 
  Recall from equation (7) that  tt t qq R    , where 
*
0
() tt t j t j
j




    and 
0






   .  If there were no excess returns, so that  tt qq R   ,  and 
* ˆˆ tt rr   were positively 
correlated with  t R , then there is a negative correlation between  t q  and 
* ˆˆ tt rr  .  That is, under uncovered 
interest parity, the high real interest rate currency tends to be stronger.  For example, this is the 
implication of the Dornbusch-Frankel theory in which real interest differentials are determined in a 
sticky-price monetary model. 
  But we can make a stronger statement – there is a relationship between the real interest 
differential, 
* ˆˆ tt rr  , and our measure of the level excess return,  ˆ
t   (where  ˆ
t   is our estimate of  t   based 
on the VAR models.)  Our central empirical finding is reported in Table 4.  This table reports the 
regression: 
(12) 
* ˆ ˆˆ () tt t t rr u        .
11 
In all cases, the estimated slope coefficient is positive.  The 90 percent confidence intervals are wide, but 
with a few exceptions, lie above zero.  The confidence interval for the G6 average strongly excludes zero.  
To get an idea of magnitudes, a one percentage point difference in annual rates between the home and 
foreign real interest rates equals a 1/12
th percentage point difference in monthly rates.  The coefficient of 
around 32 reported for the regression when we take the U.S. relative to the average of the other G7 
countries translates into around a 2.7% effect on the level risk premium.  That is, if the U.S. real rate 
                                                 
10  The exceptions are that the third confidence interval contains zero for Model 1 for France, and Models 1 and 2 for 
the U.K. 
11  To be precise,  ˆ
t    is calculated as the difference between  t q  and our VAR estimate of  t R .  To calculate our 
estimate of  t R , given by the infinite sum of equation (5), we demean 
*
tj tj rr     by its sample mean.  We use the 
sample mean rather than maximum likelihood estimate of the mean because it tends to be a more robust estimate.  
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increases one annualized percentage point above the real rate in the other countries, the dollar is predicted 
to be 2.7% stronger in real terms from the level risk premium effect. 
  This finding is surprising in light of the well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle.  In the 
previous two subsections, we have documented that when 
*
tt rr   is above average, the Home currency 
tends to have excess returns.  That seems to imply that the high interest rate currency is the riskier 
currency.  But the estimates from equation (12) deliver the opposite message – the high interest rate 
currency has the lower level risk premium.   t   is the level risk premium for the Foreign currency – it is 
positively correlated with 
*
tt rr  , so it tends to be high when 
*
tt rr   is low. 




cov( , ) cov[ ( ), ] tt t t t j t t
j




   . 
The short-run interest parity puzzle establishes that 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr    .  Clearly if 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr  , 
then we must have 
* cov[ ( ), ] 0 tt jt t Er r     for at least some  0 j  .  That is, in order for 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr  , we must have a reversal in the correlation of the short-run risk premiums with 
*
tt rr   
as the horizon extends. 
  This is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots estimates of the slope coefficient in a regression of 
1 ˆ () tt j E    on 
* ˆˆ tt rr   for  1, ,100 j   : 
 
*
, 1 ( ˆ ( ) )
j
jj t t tt j t r E ru         
For the first few j, this coefficient is negative, but it eventually turns positive at longer horizons. 
  The Figure also plots the slope of regressions of 
*
11 ˆ () tt j t j Er r     on 
* ˆˆ tt rr   for  1, ,100 j   :   
 
**
11 , ˆ () ( )
j
tt j t j r j r jt t r t E rr r r u        
These tend to be positive at all horizons.  
  The Figure also includes a plot of the slope coefficients from regressing  1 ˆ () tt j t j Eq q     for 
1, ,100 j   :   
 
*
1, ˆ ()( )
j
tt j t j q j q j t t q t E qq r r u         
Since 
*
11 1 1 ˆ ˆˆ () ( ( ) ) tt j t j t t j t t j tj Eq q E Er r            , these regression coefficients are simply the sum of 
the other two regression coefficients that are plotted.  In this case, the regression coefficients start out 
negative for the first few months, but then turn positive for longer horizons. 
  To summarize, when the Home real interest rate relative to the Foreign real interest rate is higher 
than average, the Home currency is stronger in real terms than average.  Crucially, it is even stronger than  
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would be predicted by a model of uncovered interest parity.  Excess returns or the foreign exchange risk 
premium contribute to this strength.  If Home’s real interest rate is high – in the sense that the Home 
relative to Foreign real interest rate is higher than average – the level risk premium on the Foreign 
security is higher than average.   
We can project the future path of the real exchange rate when Home real interest rates are high 
using the facts that the currency tends to be stronger than average (the finding of regression (12)), that it 
continues to appreciate in the short run (the famous puzzle, confirmed in the findings from regression (9)
), and that the real exchange rate is stationary so it is expected to return to its unconditional mean.  When 
the Home real interest rate is high, the Home currency is strong in real terms, and expected to get stronger 
in the short run.  However, eventually it must be expected to depreciate back to its long run level. 
One implication of these dynamics is similar to Jorda and Taylor’s (2009) findings about 
forecasting nominal exchange rate changes.  They find that the nominal interest differential can help to 
predict exchange rate changes in the short run: the high interest rate currency is expected to appreciate 
(contrary to the predictions of uncovered interest parity.)  But the forecasts of the exchange rate can be 
enhanced by taking into account purchasing power parity considerations.  The deviation from PPP helps 
predict movements of the nominal exchange rate as the real exchange rate adjusts toward its long-run 
level. 
Figure 1 presents a slightly different perspective.  This chart plots the slope coefficients from 
regressions of  ˆ
tj R    and  tj q   on 
*
tt rr   for the G6 average exchange rate.
12  That is, it plots the estimated 









t j Qj Qj t t Q t qr r u    
.
 
If interest parity held, the behavior of the real exchange rate should conform to the plot for  ˆ
tj R   .  
That line indicates that the U.S. dollar tends to be strong in real terms when 
*
tt rr   is high, and then is 
expected to depreciate back toward its long-run mean.  The line for the regression of  tj q   on 
*
tt rr   
shows three things:  First, when 
*
tt rr   is above average, the dollar tends to be strong in real terms, and 
much stronger than would be implied under uncovered interest parity.  Second, when 
*
tt rr   is above 
average, the dollar is expected to appreciate even more in the short run.  This is the uncovered interest 
parity puzzle.  Third, when 
*
tt rr   is above average, the dollar is expected to reach its maximum 
                                                 
12   The plots for most of the other real exchange rates look qualitatively very similar.  
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appreciation after around 5 months, then to depreciate gradually.  The line labeled “Model” is discussed 
in the next section. 
  We turn now to the implications of these empirical findings for models of the foreign exchange 
risk premium. 
 
3.  The Risk Premium 
  There is no reconciliation to the central puzzle of this paper - cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   
- if the interest differential contains all relevant information for forecasting the exchange rate.  That is, 
suppose the Fama regression equation (9) is treated as though it determines conditional expectations: 
(14) 
*
1 () tt t q q t t E qq r r     . 
If this interpretation were correct, then from equation (2), the risk premium is perfectly correlated with the 




* (1 ) ( ) tt t t t t qq t t rrE q q rr         . 
The uncovered interest rate parity puzzle finds  1 q   , so (15) implies  t   and 
*
tt rr   are perfectly 
negatively correlated.  It follows that, under this approach, 
*
0
() tt t j t j
j




    and 
0






    are perfectly negatively correlated.  Since real interest rates are strongly positively 
serially correlated, so 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t Rr r  , equation (15) must imply 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr    if  1 q   .  But the 
evidence of Table 4 shows the opposite, that 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr   .  The assumption embodied in equation 
(14) rules out our key empirical finding – that the correlation of the short-run risk premium and the level 
risk premium with 
*
tt rr  are of opposite signs.   
  Taking as given the stronger condition that  0 q   , there is a stronger implication.  Iterating 
equation (14) forward, 
(16)  tq t qq R    . 
Then we must have that the real exchange rate,  t q , is perfectly positively correlated with  t R .  Given the 
strong positive serial correlation of real interest rates, this implies we must have 
* cov( , ) 0 tt t rr q  .  That 
is, we must have a positive correlation of the real interest differential with the real exchange rate, which 
contradicts the empirical evidence.   
  Two strands of the international finance literature are potentially in conflict.  Models of the 
uncovered interest parity puzzle (interpreted as finding  0 q   ) that rely on the implicit assumption of  
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equation (14) necessarily are at loggerheads with the literature that finds a currency tends to be stronger in 
real terms when its relative real interest rate is above the long-run average. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the problem.  As already noted, this chart plots the slope coefficients from 
regressions of  ˆ
tj R    and  tj q   on 
*
tt rr   for the G6 average exchange rate – these are the lines labeled bRj 
and bQj, respectively.  The third line, labeled Model, is an example of the theoretical regression 
coefficients of   lim tt k k tj q Eq
     on 
*
tt rr   implied by the models that assume perfect correlation 
between the interest differential and the risk premium, which are discussed below in section 3.3.
13  The 
models are built to account for the empirical finding that the Home currency tends to appreciate in the 
short run when the home interest rate is high.  But the models leave the correlation of the level of the real 
exchange rate and the real interest differential with the wrong sign, and imply monotonic adjustment 
rather than the hump-shaped dynamics apparent in the data. 
  Subsequently, we use the notation  1 tt t t E qq      for the expected rate of real depreciation, and 
* d
tt t rr rr  for the Home less Foreign short-term real interest differential.  In essence, the assumption 
underlying equation (14) is that a single factor drives  t   and 
d
t r : 
(17)  11 tt a     
(18)  11 tt g     
(19)  11
d
tt rc   ,  111 cag  










as in equation (14).
14  Without loss of generality, we will assume  1 var( ) 1 t    and  1 0 a  . 
  A model that allows the short-run risk premium and level risk premium to covary with the real 
interest differential with opposite signs requires a model with at least two factors.  However, while two 
factors are necessary, they are not sufficient.  
  As Fama noted, the finding of a negative coefficient in the “Fama regression” (8) implies that the 
variance of the risk premium is greater than the variance of expected depreciation: var( ) var( ) tt    .  The 
single-agent models of the risk premium have been built to embody this property.  When there is a single 
                                                 
13  This line refers to the implied slope coefficient in the regression of    lim ti t t j j qE q     on 
d
t r  
14  We drop the constant terms hereinafter because they play no role in explaining the puzzles.  
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factor driving the risk premium and expected depreciation, we must have  11 ga  .  This condition is 







, to be negative.   
    
3.1  A two-factor model 
  The problem arises from the fact that while cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   , we have found  cov( , ) 0
d
ttj t Er     
for large enough j.  In order to account for this, we need a model that allows at least two factors to drive 
real interest rates and risk premiums: 
(21)  11 22 tt t aa    
(22)  11 22 tt t gg    
(23)  11 22
d
tt t rc c     11 1 gac  ,  22 2 gac   .
 
1t   and  2t   are independent.  Without loss of generality, we assume  12 ,0 aa , and  12 var( ) var( ) 1 tt    . 
Using these equations, we get: 
(24)  11 22 1 1 1 2 2 2 cov( , ) ( ) ( )
d
tt ra c a c a a g a a g       
Models of the uncovered interest parity puzzle are designed to account for cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  Given our 
normalizations, this requires either  11 ga   or  22 ga  .   
 Define  11 1
0






   and  11 1
0






   Iterating (22) forward: 
(25)  11 22 tt t gg   . 
We find: 
(26)  11 1 1 1 22 2 22 cov( , ) ( ) cov( , ) ( ) cov( , )
d
tt t t t t ra g g a g g        . 
Models typically assume positive serial correlation in the macroeconomic factors driving returns, so they 
have  11 cov( , ) 0 tt    and  22 cov( , ) 0 tt   .  These conditions are necessary for equation (23) to account 
for the real interest differential given that we see cov( , ) 0
d
tt Rr  .  We have established that 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    requires either  11 ga   or  22 ga  .  Since we have normalized  12 ,0 aa , then letting 
11 ga  , our finding that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   requires  22 0 ga   . 
  This condition is necessary for finding cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   , but we also need that  2t   is more 
persistent than  1t  .  Comparing (24) and (26), we also must have  22 11 cov( , ) cov( , ) tt tt     .  The 
appendix establishes necessary and sufficient conditions in order to derive both cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  .   
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  The conclusion that  22 0 ga   is necessary is a challenge for the literature’s models of risk 
premiums based on risk aversion of a representative agent.  Those models formulate preferences in order 
to generate volatile risk premiums.  Volatile risk premiums are important not only for understanding the 
uncovered interest parity puzzle, but also a number of other puzzles in asset pricing regarding returns on 
equities and the term structure.
15  In the single factor models, the condition that  11 ga   delivers the 
necessary variation in the risk premium.  The models are designed in such a way that the risk premium, 
t  , loads more heavily on the exogenous state variables that drive returns than does the expected rate of 
depreciation,  t  .  The problem is that the condition  22 0 ga    requires that the risk premium respond 
less to  2t   than does expected depreciation.   
 
3.2  Relation of excess returns to stochastic discount factors 
  Here we briefly review the basic theory of foreign exchange risk premiums and relate the factors 
driving the risk premium to the state variables driving stochastic discount factors.  See, for example, 
Backus et. al. (2001) or Brandt et. al. (2004).   
Under the assumption of absence of arbitrage, there exists a stochastic discount factor,  1 t M   such 






   for all 
j.
16  Applying this relationship to returns on Home and Foreign riskless real bonds, expressing returns in 
units of Home consumption, we have: 
(27)  1 1
t r





tt t eE M D    
where  11 / tt t DQ Q   .  Under log normality 
(29) 
1
11 2 var tt t t t rE m m    ,  
and, using  11 ttt dqq   : 
(30) 
* 11
11 1 1 1 1 22 var var cov ( , ) tt t t t t t t t t t t rE m E d m d m d          . 
Taking differences, we get 
(31) 
* 1
11 1 1 2 var cov ( , ) tt t t t t t t t t rrE d d md          . 
  For returns expressed in units of the Foreign consumption basket, there exists a stochastic 
discount factor 
*
1 t M   that satisfies 
                                                 
15 See for example Bansal and Yaron (2004). 











tt t eE M D

  .   
  Clearly for any  1 t M   that satisfies (28), there must me a 
*
1 t M   that satisfies (32) defined by 
*
11 1 tt t M MD    . Or,  
(34) 
*
111 ttt dmm  . 
In general, there is not a unique stochastic discount factor that satisfies equations (27) and (28) for returns 
in Home units, or (32) and (33) for returns in Foreign units.  The discount factor is unique when markets 
are complete.  The models we consider in the rest of section 3 assume complete markets. 
  From (31) and (34), we have: 
(35) 
*
11 tt t t t E mE m    
(36) 
* 1
11 2(var var ) tt t t t mm    .   
  We follow Backus et. al. (2001) and consider affine pricing models.  The models we examine 
express the log of the discount factors,  1 t m   and 
*






ti i t i i t i t
ii
mz z    

     
(38) 




ti i t i i t i t
ii
mz z    

     
We assume  it   and 
*
it   are i.i.d. over time, with mean zero and variance equal to one.  The  it   are 
mutually independent as are the 
*
it  , but  it   and 
*
it   could be correlated for each i.  We assume the factors 
follow the processes: 
(39)  11 (1 ) it i i i it it zz        ,  
where 01 i   , and  it   are i.i.d. over time with mean zero and variance equal to one.  Equations (37)-
(39) are a special case of the general formulation in Backus et. al. (2001), but encompass all of the models 
we subsequently discuss.  This formulation allows for independent factors to influence  1 t m   and 
*
1 t m   
because some of the  i  , 
*
i  ,  i  , and 
*
i   may be zero. 







tt t t i i i t
i
E mm z     

       
(41) 
*2 * 2 11
11 22
1
(var ( ) var ( )) ( )
k
tt tt t i i i t
i
mm z   

      
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  We can see that the risk premium and the expected depreciation in this setting are driven by the 
state variables that determine the stochastic discount factors.  In section 3.1, we showed that to account 
for cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  , we need k to equal at least two.  If, for example,  2 k  , and 
normalizing 
*
11 0    and 
*
22 0   , the necessary conditions derived in the previous section can be 
expressed as 
*2 * 2 1
11 1 1 2 0( )       and 
2* 2 * 1
22 22 2 0( )       . 
  The no-arbitrage conditions, equations (27)-(28) and (32)-(33) must hold under very general 
conditions, but they also do not by themselves give us much insight into the economic determinants of the 
risk premium.  As Backus et. al. (2010) say, “It is almost a tautology that we can represent exchange rates 
as ratios of nominal pricing kernels in different currency units: It is less a tautology that we can write 
down sensible stochastic processes for variables that are consistent with the carry trade evidence.”  We 
next turn to models built on utility-maximizing representative agents with rational expectations in the 
Home and Foreign countries.  In these models,  1 t M   and 
*
1 t M   are the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitutions for Home and Foreign agents, respectively.   
  In this case, we can interpret  t   as a risk premium that rewards investors for taking on 
undiversifiable risk.  For Home agents, the excess return on Foreign bonds is given by  
* 1
11 1 1 2 var cov ( , ) tt t t t t t tt rrE d d md        .  For Foreign investors, the excess return on Foreign bonds 
is 
** 1
11 1 1 2 var cov ( , ) tt t t t t t tt rrE d d md        .    The excess return on Foreign bonds is not the same for 
Home and Foreign agents because the investors consider returns in different units.  Intuition is aided by 














As with any asset, the excess return is determined by the covariance of the return with the stochastic 
discount factor.  If the foreign exchange return,  1 t d   is positively correlated with the Home discount 
factor,  1 t m  , Home investors require a compensation for risk so the Foreign security has an excess return 
relative to the Home bond.  For Foreign investors, the foreign exchange return on a Home bond is  1 t d   .  
If  1 t d    is positively correlated with the Foreign discount factor, 
*
1 t m  , the Home asset is relatively risky, 
implying a lower excess return on the Foreign bond.   
  The challenge is to construct a model of the Home and Foreign representative agents’ stochastic 
discount factors of the form of equations (37) and (38), with  2 k  , where 
*2 * 2 1
2 0( ) ii i i       and 
2* 2 * 1
2 0( ) j jj j        for some i and j. 
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3.3  Models of foreign exchange risk premium based on the stochastic discount factor  
  In this section, we examine models of the risk premium,  t  , that are based on specifications of 
the stochastic discount factors derived from underlying models of preferences.   Verdelhan (2010) builds 
a model based on the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) specification of external habit persistence to explain the 
familiar uncovered interest parity puzzle.  The Appendix shows that this model cannot account for the 
main empirical findings of this paper because the risk premium and expected depreciation are driven by a 
single factor.   
   We focus attention on the “long-run risks” model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), based on Epstein-
Zin (1989) preferences.  Colacito and Croce (2011) have recently applied the model to understand several 
properties of equity returns, real exchange rates and consumption.  Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) and 
Backus, Gavazzoni, Telmer and Zin (2010) demonstrate how the “long-run risks” model based on can 
account for the interest-parity anomaly.  We will see, however, that the formulations of the model 
considered in these papers are not able to account for the empirical findings of Section 2 of this paper, 
principally because they are designed to account for the finding that var( ) var( ) tt    .   
  These papers directly extend equilibrium closed-economy models to a two-country open-
economy setting.  The closed economy models assume an exogenous stream of endowments, with 
consumption equal to the endowment.  The open-economy versions assume an exogenous stream of 
consumption in each country.  These could be interpreted either as partial equilibrium models, with 
consumption given but the relation between consumption and world output unmodeled.  Or they could be 
interpreted as general equilibrium models in which each country consumes an exogenous stream of its 
own endowment and there is no trade between countries.  Under the latter interpretation, the real 
exchange rate is a shadow price, since in the absence of any trade in goods, there can be no trade in assets 
that have any real payoff. 
  The consumption streams in each country are taken to follow unit root processes, as in the closed 
economy analogs, but with no assumption of cointegration.  That implies that relative consumption levels 
and real exchange rates have unit roots, implications which do not have strong empirical support.  
However, relative real interest differentials and excess returns in these models are stationary.  The 
moments that are of concern to us, cov( , )
d
tt r   and cov( , )
d
tt r  , are well defined, and the analysis of the 
necessary conditions for cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    of section 3.1 applies.   
  Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) apply the “long-run risks” model to the uncovered interest parity 
puzzle.  In each country, households are assumed to have Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences.  The Home 
agent’s utility is defined by the recursive relationship:  
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(43)    
1/
/
1 (1 ) tt t t UC E U

        
. 
In this relationship,   measures the patience of the consumer, 1    is the degree of relative risk 
aversion, and 1/(1 )    is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  Bansal and Shaliastovich focus on 
the case of    , which corresponds to the case in which agents prefer an early resolution of risk, and in 
which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one, 0 1    .  A stronger assumption, 
0   , is required to account for the uncovered interest parity puzzle, so we will adopt this assumption (as 
does the literature) in the subsequent discussion.   
  We will consider a somewhat more general version of the long-run risks model than is present in 
the literature, in order to explore channels through which it might be able to account for our empirical 
findings.   
  Assume an exogenous path for consumption in each country. In the Home country (with 
ln( ) tt cC  ): 
(44)  11
hc x
tt t t t t cc lu u      . 
The conditional expectation of consumption growth is given by  t l   .  The component  t l  represents a 
persistent consumption growth modeled as a first-order autoregression: 
(45)  11
hc l
tl t t t t ll w w      . 
The innovations,  1
x
t    and  1
l
t    are assumed to be uncorrelated within each country, distributed 








t   , which are 
mutually uncorrelated.) 
  In the Foreign country, we have: 
(46) 
** * * *
11
f cx





tl t t t t ll w w       
  The conditional variances are written as the sum of two independent components.  The 
component with the h superscript is idiosyncratic to the Home country.  An f superscript refers to the 
Foreign idiosyncratic component.  The one with the c superscript is common to the Home and Foreign 
country.  Conditional variances are stochastic and follow first-order autoregressive processes: 
(48)  11 (1 )
ii i i i i i u
tu u u t u t uu         ,  ,, ih f c   
(49)  11 (1 )
ii i i i i i w
tw w w t w t ww         .  ,, ih f c    
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The innovations,  1
iu
t    and  1
iw
t   ,  ,, ih f c   are assumed to be uncorrelated, distributed i.i.d. with mean 
zero and unit variance. 
  We can log linearize the first-order conditions as in Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005).  We will 
ignore terms that are not time-varying or that do not affect both the conditional means and variances of 
the stochastic discount factors, lumping those variables into the catchall terms  t   and 
*
t  . 
  The Home discount factor is given by: 
(50)  11 1 () ( )
rh c r h c r h c x r h c l
t u tt w t t x tt t lt t t t mu uw w u u w w                . 
  The Foreign discount factor is given by: 
(51) 
** * * ** **
1 11 () ( )
rf c r f c r f c x r f c l
t u tt w t t x tt t lt t t t mu uw w u u w w                . 
The parameters in these log-linearization are: 
() / 2
r
u         ** * * () / 2
r
u       2 () / 2
r
wl        ** * * * 2 () / 2
r
wl     
1
r
x        ** 1
r
x        ()
r
ll          ** * * ()
r
ll       
  /(1 ) ll        ** * * /(1 ) ll        
  
  Bansal and Shaliastovich assume that the long-run expected growth component of consumption, 
t l , is the same in the Home and Foreign countries on the grounds that long-run growth prospects are 
nearly identical across countries.
17  They also assume identical parameters in the two countries.  Under 
these assumptions, Bansal and Shaliastovich find: 
(52)  ()
rh f





tx t t uu    
  Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) assume agents have a preference for early resolution of risk, 
   , and that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one, which requires 0 1    .  
As Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) explain, these parameter choices are needed in order for this model to 
account for variance asset pricing facts, such as the term structure of interest rates.
18  Further, Bansal and 
Shaliastovich assume  0   , in which case the model can generate cov( , ) 0
d







u    , so expected depreciation is less volatile than the risk premium.  This in turn 
means that we must have cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  .  Effectively, under this formulation, the risk premium and 
                                                 
17  As noted above, Bansal and Shaliastovich do not assume cointegration of the consumption processes, so shocks 
to the level of consumption in each country result in permanent level differences. 
18 See Bansal and Yaron (2004).  
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expected depreciation are driven by a single factor,  
hf
tt uu  , but we have seen that a single factor model 
cannot explain both cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   . 
  Backus et. al. (2010) do not impose the restriction that long-run expected growth in the Home 
country,  t l , is identically equal to the corresponding variable in the Foreign country, 
*
t l .  But they do 
assume identical parameters for Home and Foreign household preferences, and assume identical 
parameters in the stochastic processes for consumption growth.  In this case, equations (52) and (53) 
generalize (ignoring terms involving  t   and 
*
t  ) to: 
(54)  () ( )
rh f r h f
tu tt w t t uu ww      
(55) 
22 11
22 () ( ) () ( )
rh f r hf
tx t t l t t uu ww     . 
 Assuming  0    and 0 1    as above, we find cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    is  0    and 0 1   , but in 
this case the coefficients on 
hf
tt uu   and 
hf
tt ww   in the risk premium equation (55) are larger in absolute 
value than the coefficients in the equation for expected depreciation, (54).  This can be seen because 
under these restrictions,  0
r
u   ,  0
r
w   , 
2 1
2() ( 1 2 ) / 20
rr
ux           and 
22 1
2() ( ) / 20
rr
wl l          .  We obtain 
(56)     
22 11
22 ()( ) ()( )
rr h f rr h f
ux t t t wl t t












   
        
. 
In equation (57), we have used the fact that Backus et. al. assume the persistence of the variance shocks is 
the same in the two countries, and the same for each component so that we can define 
hfc
uuu u     
and 
hfc
wwww   .  Therefore, the model also predicts cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    under these parameter 
assumptions, and contrary to the data. 
  The underlying difficulty with these models is that they have been designed to account for the 
empirical observation that var( ) var( ) tt    .  That relationship must hold, as Fama (1984) pointed out, for 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  In order to account for this relationship, the literature has engineered models in which  t   
and  t   react to the same exogenous factors, but  t   reacts more.  In other words, preferences are specified 
so that if we have  11 22 tt t aa    and  11 22 tt t gg     , the models are designed so that the absolute 
values of  1 g  and  2 g  are greater than the absolute values of  1 a  and  2 a , respectively.  We showed, 
however, that to account for our finding that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   , we need one of the  i g  to be smaller in  
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absolute value than the corresponding  i a .  The assumptions that are built in to account for a volatile risk 
premium preclude the possibility that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   . 
  We can consider more general assumptions than those in the literature, but the long-run risks 
model does not appear promising.  The Appendix demonstrates the following propositions: 
  Proposition A       Assume Home and Foreign households have identical preferences.  Then 
under the model described in equations (46)-(51), with the parameter restrictions   0    and 0 1   , 
we cannot have both cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   . 
  Proposition B     Assume there are no common factors driving the variances of consumption 
growth:  0
cc
tt uw  .  Then under the model described in equations (46)-(51), with the parameter 
restrictions   0    and 0 1    , we cannot have both cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   . 
  The assumptions of Proposition A are more general than even those in Backus et. al. (2010).  That 
paper assumes that both preferences and the parameters of the stochastic processes driving consumption 
are identical in the Home and Foreign countries.  Proposition A shows that even if we allow for different 
parameters in the processes for consumption (and the variances of consumption), the restrictions on 
parameters that allow the model to account for the interest parity puzzle preclude the model from 
delivering cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  . 
  However, if we rely on taste differences across countries, the model might be able to account for 
the empirical findings of this paper.  The Appendix derives two examples of parameter assumptions from 
the long-run risks model that will deliver cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  With enough degrees of 
freedom to choose parameters in a model, that is not surprising, but the question remains open on whether 
the choice of preference parameters that make the model consistent with both cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   are, first, empirically verifiable, and, second, consistent with other empirical regularities. 
  The consistency with other empirical regularities is perhaps called into question by Proposition B, 
which shows that the model with idiosyncratic factors only is not adequate.  The preference parameters in 
the two countries must be chosen in a way that the loadings on common factors can deliver 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  .  The necessity of different loadings on common factors is strongly reminiscent of the 
findings of Lustig et. al. (2008).  That paper finds that to account for the cross-sectional differences in risk 
premiums, in an affine pricing model, there must be differences in the responses of the stochastic discount 
factors across countries to common risk factors.  However, as the Appendix shows, in order to explain 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  , the long-run risks model must have the opposite relation as the one posited in Lustig et. 
al. (2008) to explain their cross-sectional findings.  That is, in response to the common factor, we find low  
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interest rate currencies must be less risky, which is the opposite of Lustig et. al.’s finding that low interest 
rate currencies need to load more on the common factor. 
  In short, existing models developed to account for the interest-parity puzzle are not adequate for 
understanding the empirical findings highlighted in this paper.  In particular, there must first be some 
feature of the model that allows for the risk premium to be volatile in the short run, so that the risk 
premium reacts more to one of the state variables than does expected depreciation.  Many models have 
been built to provide plausible accounts of this relationship, which implies that the high interest rate 
currency is riskier in the short run.  Somehow, however, we also need models that can explain why in the 
long run, the high interest rate currency is expected to be less risky.  The challenge is to provide a 
plausible mechanism that also is consistent with other empirical asset pricing regularities. 
 
4.  Other Issues  
4.1  Whose price index? 
  The empirical approach taken in section 2 requires taking a stand on the appropriate price index 
used to deflate nominal returns for the Home and Foreign investor.  In each country, we deflated nominal 
returns using the consumer price index measure of inflation.  The theory of the risk premium discussed in 
section 3.3, however, applies to a representative agent, but the theory does not give us any guide as to 
which real world price index best represents the model’s representative agent. 
  However, Engel (1993,1999) presents evidence that there is very little within-country variation in 
prices compared to the variation of the real exchange rate, at least for the U.S. relative to other advanced 
countries.  The real exchange rate is given by 
*
tt t t qspp   .  In turn each log price index is a weighted 















 .  The papers show, in essence, 
that there is very high correlation between 
*
ti ti t s pp    for almost all goods, and these are very highly 
correlated with  t q .  On the other hand, relative prices of goods within a country,  it jt p p  , generally have 
much lower variance than 
*
ti ti t s pp . The implication is that if we consider price indexes that use 
different weights than the CPI weights, the constructed real exchange rate will still be highly correlated 
with  t q . 
This suggests that there probably is not much to be gained by ascribing some other price index to 
the representative investor.  That is, changing the weights on the goods in the price index is unlikely to 




4.2  The method when real exchange rates are non-stationary  
  If the real exchange rate is non-stationary, the empirical method used here can be adapted.  The 
forward iteration that is the foundation of the empirical study,    lim tt t j t t j qE qR      , does not 
require that the real exchange rate be stationary.  Instead, we could measure    lim ttj j Eq   as the 
permanent component of the real exchange rate.  The level risk premium,  t  , could then be constructed 
as      lim tt j j t t R qE q     . 
The Appendix presented evidence that the real exchange rate is stationary, so there is no 
permanent component.  Another approach, potentially, is to measure the permanent component using the 
Beveridge-Nelson (1981) decomposition, or some related method.
19  However, Engel (2000) discusses the 
problem of near observational equivalence of stationary and non-stationary representations of the real 
exchange rate.  Suppose the real exchange rate is the sum of a pure random walk component,  t  , and a 
transitory component,  t  .  Engel (2000) argues, based on an economic model and evidence from 
disaggregated prices, that it is plausible that U.S. real exchange rates contain a transitory component that 
itself is very persistent (though stationary) and very volatile (high innovation variance.)  There may be a 
random walk component related to the relative price of nontraded goods, but this component has a low 
innovation variance.  The transitory component,  t  , dominates the forecast variance of real exchange 
rates even for reasonably long horizons because it is so persistent and volatile. 
In this case, there are two dangers in trying to separate a transitory component from the 
permanent component.  On the one hand, even if the real exchange rate were stationary, so that  0 t   , 
the econometrician may not reject a random walk because of the high persistence of  t  .  The permanent-
transitory decomposition might mistakenly determine that there is a permanent component that accounts 
for most of the variation of the real exchange rate, with little role for a transitory component. 
The other danger is the opposite – that the econometrician uses powerful enough methods to 
detect the stationarity of  t  , but does not tease out the random-walk component,  t  .  In this case, the 
econometrician might conclude that all movements in the real exchange rate are transitory (though quite 
persistent).   
We have rejected a unit root in the real exchange rate, and so conclude that there is only a  t   
component.  However, if the  t   component has such a small innovation variance that it is undetectable, 
                                                 
19  See Morley, Nelson, and Zivot (2003) for a discussion of the relationship between the Beveridge-Nelson 
decomposition and more restrictive state-space decompositions.  
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then for our purposes it is reasonable to measure the transitory component,  t  , by the actual real 
exchange rate.  If Engel’s (2000) characterization of U.S. real exchange rate dynamics is correct, then 
there is not much to be gained by trying to undertake a permanent-transitory decomposition, and 
analyzing the transitory component rather than the actual real exchange rate. 
 
4.3  The term structure  
  There are two possible ways to see connections between this study and studies of the term 
structure.  First, is there a relationship between the findings here, and those of Alexius (2001) and Chinn 
and Meredith (2004) that interest-parity holds better at long horizons using long-term interest 
differentials?  (Note that Bekaert, Wei, and Xing (2007) do not find evidence to support this claim.)  The 
answer is no, not directly.  Our study does not derive any relationship between long-term interest rates 
and exchange rate changes.  It is critical to realize that the prospective real interest rate,  t R , is not a long-
term rate but instead an infinite sum of expected short-term rates.  The two differ because long-term 
interest rates incorporate a term premium.  Our study has not offered any insights into the relationship 
between the term premium and exchange rates.
20 
  Another connection is that there is an analogy to the uncovered interest parity puzzle in the term 
structure literature.  The long-short yield differential can predict excess returns.  However, the literature 
on the term structure does not have evidence such as that in Figure 2 – that the expected excess return 
reverses signs at some horizon.  We can draw an analogy between the Fama regression for exchange rates 
and a version of the empirical work that establishes the term structure anomaly.  Let  , tn p  be the log of the 
price of a bond with n periods to maturity at time t, that has a payoff of one (in levels) at maturity.  If an 
investor holds that bond for one period, the return is  1, 1 , tn t n p p   .  The expected excess return is given by 
1, 1 ,
b
tt t n t n t E pp r     , where  t r  is the return on a one-period bond.  The yield to maturity of the bond 
with n periods to maturity is given by  ,, / tn tn yp n  .  Then consider the regression: 




t n tn tn t t yy y r u
n
       

. 
If the expectations hypothesis of the term structure held, we would find  0    and  1   .  Instead, the 
empirical literature tends to find  1   , and sometimes  0   .
21  Equation (58) is equivalent to: 
(59)    1, 1 , , 1 (1 )( ) tn t n t t n t t p pr yr u           , 
                                                 
20  To be sure, many papers, such as those of Verdelhan (2010) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) build models 
that are meant to account for both the term premium and the uncovered interest parity puzzle. 
21 See for example Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Dai and Singleton (2002).  
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where  (1 ) n     , and  (1 ) tt un u    .  The expected value at time t of the left-hand side of this 
regression is 
b
t  , so  1    implies  , cov( , ) 0
b
tt t n t ry    .  This is analogous to the finding in the foreign 
exchange literature that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  







tn t t j t t j
jj




   . 
The equivalent to our finding in foreign exchange markets that cov( , ) 0
d




cov( , ) 0
n
b






  .  Just as cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    requires cov( , ) 0
d





cov( , ) 0
n
b






   is that  , cov( , ) 0
b
ttj t n t Er y      for some j.  However, so far such 
evidence has not been established in the term structure literature. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
  When a country’s interest rate is relatively high, the country’s short-term bonds tend to have a 
higher return than their counterpart in another country, at least among the U.S.-G7 country pairs.  At the 
same time, when that country’s interest rate is high, its currency tends to be very strong – stronger than 
would be implied under uncovered interest parity.  The first empirical regularity suggests that the returns 
on the high-interest rate currency incorporate a risk premium, but the second empirical finding suggests 
the opposite – that the overall effect of currency risk is to strengthen the high-interest rate currency.  
These two facts are difficult to understand by looking only at the behavior of a particular risk-averse 
agent in each country.  Section 3 demonstrates the difficulties to this approach.     
There have been several recent studies that attempt to build theoretical models to account for the 
uncovered interest parity that do not rely on modeling the preferences of agents, but instead model the 
interaction of more than one group of agents.  These papers build models that are designed to explain the 
first empirical fact – the uncovered interest rate parity puzzle.   
Frankel and Froot (1990) introduce a model with two groups of agents, chartists and 
fundamentalists, each following ad hoc behavioral rules.  The chartists base their asset choice on 
extrapolation of the exchange rate returns from the past, while the fundamentalists form their expectations 
based on a model of macroeconomic fundamentals.  Neither group of agents have expectations that are 
rational – the fundamentalists expectations do not take into account the effect of the chartists on the 
equilibrium exchange rate.  
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Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2008) build a two-country model in which the fraction of agents in 
each country that participate in financial markets varies over time.  In each country, agents are 
constrained to use their own local currency to purchase their consumption good which is also produced 
locally.  In asset markets, agents can trade interest earning bonds denominated in their own currency for 
interest earning foreign currency bonds.  They can also trade currencies in the asset market.  The 
household is split into two parts – one that deals in the goods market and the other that deals in the asset 
market.  For a fixed cost each period, the household can transfer money from the asset market to the 
goods market to be used for goods purchases.  The fraction of households that transfer money each period 
is endogenous in equilibrium, and depends on the money growth rate.  The risk premium in this model is 
linked to the variance of the stochastic discount factor of the “active” households – the ones that have 
paid the fixed cost to transfer money between asset and goods markets.   
  The model of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) in which some agents are slow to adjust their 
portfolio produces dynamics that accord with some of the empirical findings of this paper.  In the model, 
there is a group of agents that does not change its portfolio when the state of the economy changes.  
Portfolios adjust only when new agents enter the financial market in the overlapping generation model 
developed here.  When the Home short-term interest rate is high, the Home currency appreciates, but only 
new entrants to the market choose portfolios based on the higher short-term interest rate.  Over time, more 
agents enter the market, and the currency then is expected to appreciate further for several months before 
depreciating.   
None of these papers explicitly delineates how the level of the real exchange rate is related to 
interest rates because they are primarily concerned with the short-run excess returns.  However, the 
mechanism in these papers seems intuitively to be incompatible with our findings that the high-interest 
rate currency has a low level risk premium.  These models essentially rely on underreaction to explain the 
exchange rate dynamics in response to an interest rate increase.  When the interest rate rises, one group of 
agents does not react – the chartists in Frankel and Froot, and the inactive agents in Alvarez et. al. and in 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop.  The second group of agents does not take full advantage of the profit 
opportunity that might arise, either because this group is itself not fully rational (the fundamentalists in 
Frankel and Froot) or because it is risk averse (the active agents in Alvarez et. al. and Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop.)  These dynamics imply that in the short run, the currency appreciates less than it would if all 
agents were fully active.  Apparently, the models cannot account for the fact that the currency initially 
appreciates more than it would under uncovered interest parity, which is a key finding of this paper.  
Bachetta and van Wincoop do compare the dynamics of the real exchange rate in their model compared to 
one in which all the portfolios are actively managed.  The currency never appreciates in their model at 
any horizon as much as it would under active management, so the model does not deliver the key fact that  
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the high-interest rate currency incorporates a level risk premium that strengthens the currency beyond its 
no-risk-premium level.   Since none of the papers presents directly the implications of their models for the 
statistics derived in this paper, it is not clear how they perform in this regard, but at an intuitive level they 
do not seem well equipped to deal with the level risk premium puzzle. 
Several recent papers have explored the implications for rare, large currency depreciations for the 
uncovered interest parity puzzle.  Farhi and Gabaix (2009) present a full general equilibrium model of 
rare disasters and real exchange rates.  Their model implies that when the Home real interest rate is high, 
the Home currency is weak in real terms, and so cannot account for the levels puzzle presented here.
22  
This correlation occurs during “normal times” in their model – the anticipation of a future disaster leads 
to a simple positive correlation between the real interest differential and the real exchange rate.  
Nonetheless, there are two caveats that must be considered in light of Farhi and Gabaix and the related 
literature.  The first is that if rare disasters are important, than the linear VAR technology used in this 
paper may not correctly capture the stochastic process for real exchange rates and real interest rates.  
Farhi et. al. (2009) and Burnside et. al. (2010a) extract information from options to infer expectations 
about rare large movements in exchange rates.  Moreover, if these large rare events are important, then 
the lognormal approximations that lie behind our analysis of the risk premium in sections 3.3 and 3.4 are 
not correct.  Higher order cumulants matter for the risk premium in that case.
23     
  It may be that it is necessary to abandon the assumption that all agents have fully rational 
expectations.  Some version of the model proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) may account for the 
empirical results uncovered here, which perhaps could be described as a combination of overreaction and 
momentum trading.  That is, the short-term behavior of the real exchange rate under high interest rates 
incorporates overreaction in that the currency appreciates more than it would under interest parity.  But 
perhaps momentum trading leads to expectations of further appreciation in the short run when the interest 
rate is high.  Burnside et. al. (2010b), and Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), are recent approaches that have 
relaxed the assumption of full rationality in some way.  Ilut (2010) adopts an optimizing approach in 
which ambiguity averse agents who are averse to uncertainty may underreact to good news and overreact 
to bad news.   
  Finally, Table 2b may contain a clue toward a model that helps to resolve the empirical puzzles.  
In that table, we find that an increase in Home relative to Foreign expected inflation tends to be associated 
with an expected real appreciation of the Home currency, holding the real interest differential constant.  
This regularity for the G7 country pairs is very different than what has been found to hold in relatively 
                                                 
22 See also Guo (2009), Gourio et. al. (2010) and Gourinchas et. al. (2010). 
23 See Martin (2010).  
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high inflation emerging economies.
24  In those countries, higher expected inflation in a country tends to 
be reflected in a higher expected nominal currency depreciation and a higher local nominal interest rate.  
The net effect is to make uncovered interest parity, in nominal terms, hold better empirically for emerging 
economies than developed countries.  To contrast, here we find that higher expected Home inflation leads 
to an appreciation, not a depreciation, of the Home currency.  Moreover, this expected appreciation is in 
real terms, and does not work through the effect on the current real interest differential (since the 
regression controls for the latter variable.)  This suggests some sort of interaction between monetary 
policy and real exchange rates, but the connection to excess returns is not straightforward.   
  High real interest rates tend to strengthen a currency.  That is common wisdom in foreign 
exchange markets.  It fits the textbook description of exchange rate behavior, and is consistent with the 
empirical evidence in this paper and in other recent studies.  This regularity cannot be ignored when we 
try to explain the uncovered interest parity puzzle.  The high interest rate country may have short run 
excess returns (the uncovered interest parity puzzle), but it has a strong currency as well. 
                                                 
24  See Bansal and Dahquist (2000).  
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s    90% c.i. ( ˆ
s  )  ˆ
s    90% c.i. ( ˆ
s  ) 
Canada -0.045  (-0.250,0.160)  -1.271  (-2.355,-0.186) 
France -0.028  (-0.346,0.290)  -0.216  (-1.603,1.171) 
Germany 0.192  (-0.136,0.520)  -1.091  (-2.583,0.401) 
Italy 0.032  (-0.325,0.389)  0.661  (-0.359,1.680) 
Japan 0.924  (0.504,1.343)  -2.713  (-4.036,-1.390) 
United Kingdom  -0.410  (-0.768,-0.051)  -2.198  (-4.225,-0.170) 
G6 0.054  (-0.184,0.292)  -1.467  (-3.164,0.231) 
Notes: 90 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Fama Regression in Real Terms: 
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Notes: 90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports 
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Notes: 90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports 
a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval bootstrap.  See Appendix for details. 
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Notes: 90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The 
second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval 
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Notes: 90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The 
second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval 
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Figures plot the slope coefficients of these regressions: 
brj refers to slope in 
**
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Appendix to section 2: Evidence on stationarity of real exchange rates 
  Table A1 presents standard ADF tests for a unit root.  The null is not rejected for any currency except 
the U.K. pound at the 10 percent level.  The table also includes tests for a unit root based on the GLS test 
proposed by Elliott et. al. (1996).  These tests show stronger evidence against a unit root – the null is rejected at 
the 5% level for three currencies, at the 10% level for two others, and not rejected for the Canadian dollar or 
Japanese yen.  However, the test statistic is based on the assumption that there may be a trend in the real 
exchange rate under the alternative, which is not a realistic assumption for these real exchange rates.   
  We next follow much of the recent literature on testing for a unit root in real exchange rates by 
exploiting the power from panel estimation.  The lower panel of Table A1 reports estimates from a panel 
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Under the null, the change in the real exchange rate for country i follows an autoregressive process of order  i k .  
Note that the parameters and the lag lengths can be different across the currencies.  Under the alternative: 
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with a common   for the currencies. 
 We  estimate    for the six currencies from (2).
25  We find the lag length for each currency by first 
estimating a univariate version of (2), and using the BIC criterion.  The estimated value of   is reported in the 
lower panel of Table 1, in the row labeled “no covariates”.   
  This table also reports the bootstrapped distribution of  .  The bootstrap is constructed by estimating 
(1), then saving the residuals for the six real exchange rates for each time period.  We then construct 5000 
artificial time series (each of length 440, corresponding to our sample of 440 months) for the real exchange rate 
by resampling the residuals and using the estimates from (1) to parameterize the model. 
  The lower panel of Table A1, in the row labeled “no covariates” reports certain points of the 
distribution of   from the bootstrap.  We see that we can reject the null of a unit root at the 5 percent level. 
  We also consider a version of the panel test in which we include covariates.  Specifically, we 
investigate the possibility that the inflation differential (with the U.S.) helps account for the dynamics of the 
real exchange rate.  We follow the same procedure as above, but add lagged own relative inflation terms to 
equation (2).  To generate the distribution of the estimate of  , we estimate a VAR in the change in the real 
                                                 
25 We do not include the average G6 real exchange rate as a separate real exchange rate in this test.  
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exchange rate (as in (1)) and the inflation rate.  For each country, the real exchange rate and inflation rates 
depend only on own-country lags under the null.  The bootstrap proceeds as in the model with no covariates.   
  The bottom panel of Table A1 reports the estimated   and its distribution for the model with 
covariates in the row labeled “with covariates”.  Adding covariates does not alter the conclusion that we can 
reject a unit root at the 5 percent level. 
  Based on these tests, we will proceed to treat the real exchange rate as stationary, though we note that 
the evidence favoring stationarity is thin for the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen real exchange rates. 
 
Table A1 
Tests for Unit Root in Real Exchange Rates 
 
Univariate Unit Root Tests, 1973:3-2009:10 
Country ADF  DF-GLS 
Canada -1.771  -1.077 
France -2.033  -2.036* 
Germany -2.038  -2.049* 
Italy -1.888  -1.914† 
Japan -2.071  -0.710 
United Kingdom  -2.765†  -2.076* 
G6 -2.052  -1.846† 
* significant at 5% level, † significant at 10% level 
 
Panel Unit Root Test, 1973:3-2009:10 
Model Estimated  Coefficient  1%  5%  10% 
No  Covariates  -0.01705*  -0.02199 -0.01697 -0.01485 
With  Covariates  -0.01703*  -0.02174 -0.01697 -0.01455 
* significant at 5% level 
 
Appendix to section 2.2: Bootstraps   
For both bootstraps in the results reported in Tables 2A, 2B, 3, and 4, we construct pseudo-samples 
using the VAR estimates.
26  For each pseudo-sample, we estimate the VAR.  We estimate all of the regression 
coefficients reported in Tables 2A, 2B, 3 and 4, and calculate the Newey-West standard errors for each of those 
regressions.  We repeat this exercise 1000 times.   
  The first confidence interval based on the bootstraps (the second confidence interval reported for each 
coefficient estimate) uses the coefficient estimates reported in the tables.  Let  ˆ   refer to any of the coefficient 
estimates reported in Tables 2A, 2B, 3 and 4.  From the regressions on the pseudo-samples, we order the 
coefficient estimates from these 1000 replications from smallest to largest -  1 ˆ   is the smallest and  1000 ˆ  be the 
largest. The confidence interval reported in the tables is based on ( 950 50 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ [( ) ,( ) ]      .  That is, the 
                                                 
26 Initial values are set at the sample means.  We generate samples of 865 observations, then use the last 365 observations, 
corresponding to the length of the time series we use in estimation.  
  3
reported confidence interval corrects for the asymmetry in the distribution of  ˆ
i   from the regressions on the 
pseudo-samples. 
Hansen (2010) argues that the first bootstrap method performs poorly when the  ˆ
i   do not have a 
symmetric distribution.  Instead, he recommends the following procedure.    As above, let  ˆ   refer to the 
estimated coefficient in the data, and  ˆ   to be the Newey-West standard error in the data.  For each pseudo-
sample i, we will record analogous estimates:  ˆ










 .  We arrange these  i   
from smallest to largest, so that  1   is the smallest and  1000   is the largest.  The third confidence interval 
reported for each coefficient estimate is given by  950 50 ˆˆ ˆˆ [,]      .  It turns out that our two bootstraps 
generally produce very similar confidence intervals. 
 
Appendix to section 3.1: Necessary and sufficient conditions for cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    
  The model is given by equations (21)-(23) and (25).  Assume the necessary conditions developed in the 
paper,  11 ga   and  22 0 ga  , are satisfied.  We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  . 
  From equation (24), cov( , ) 0
d















 From  equation(26),  cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   requires 
22 2 11













  Combining these two conditions gives us the necessary and sufficient conditions for cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    
and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  : 
(3) 
22 2 2 2 11
11 2 2 1 1 1
var( ) cov( , )











must hold, as well as  11 ga   and  22 0 ga  . 
  In the models based on utility maximization that we consider, the factors  1t   and  2t   follow first-order 
autoregressions: 
  11 (1 ) it i i i it i it            
where 01 i   , and  (0,1) it NID   .  In this case, condition (3) becomes 
(4) 
1 21 1 2 1
12 2 2 1 2
var( ) (1 )












 Appendix to section 3.3:  Verdelhan’s (2010) model using Campbell-Cochrane preferences 






() / ( 1 )
j








  , 
where   is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  t H  represents an external habit.   t H  is defined 
implicitly by defining the “surplus”,    ln ( )/ tt t t s CHC  , where  t C  is aggregate consumption, and  t s  is 
assumed to follow the stochastic process: 
(6)  11 (1 ) ( )( ) tt t t t s ss s cc g        , 01    . 
Here,   and s  are parameters, and  ln( ) tt cC   is assumed to follow a simple random walk: 
(7)  11 tt t cg c u   , where 
2
1 .. .  (0 , ) t ui i d N    . 
() t s   represents the sensitivity of the surplus to consumption growth, and is given by: 
(8) 
1
() 12 ( )1 tt ss s
S
    , when  max t s s  , 0 elsewhere. 
The log of the stochastic discount factor is given by: 
(9)   11 ln( ) ( 1)( ) (1 ( ))( ) tt t t t mg s s s c c g              
When the parameters S  and  max s  are suitably normalized, Verdelhan shows we can write the expected 
rate of depreciation as: 
(10) 
* (1 )( ) tt t s s      , 
where 
*
t s  is the Foreign surplus.  The excess return is given by: 
(11) 
22 2 * (/ ) ( ) tt t Sss     . 
  Under the assumption of Verdelhan (2010) that   
22 2 1/ S     , this model can account for the 
empirical finding of cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  However, this assumption that the risk premium responds more to the 
current state, 
*
tt s s  , than the expected depreciation will not allow us to account for cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  . 
 
Appendix to section3.3:  Proofs of Propositions A and B 
Proposition A 
  Now consider the generalization of Backus et. al. (2010) in which all preference parameters are 
assumed to be identical across the two countries (
*    , 
*    , 
*    ), but the stochastic processes for the 
random variables are not assumed identical, the model still cannot account for both cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  .  
  5




















.  The 
case of identical preferences is a special case.  When preferences are identical, the relevant parameters become: 
() / 2
r
u         *rr
uu        2 () / 2
r
wl        ** 2 2 (/ )
rr
ww ll       /(1 ) ll     
1
r
x        *rr
x x        ()
r
ll          ** (/)
rr
ll l l        ** /(1 ) ll    










 since both ratios equal one.  We can also see under identical 
preferences that 
































.  We can write the equation for 
the log of the Foreign pricing kernel as: 
(12) 
** * * * *
1 11 () ( )
rf c r f cr f c x r f c l
t u u R tt w w R t t x tt t lt t t t mu uw w u u w w                 , 
We find: 
(13)  (( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) )
rh f c r h f c
tu tu R t u R t w t w R t w R t uu u ww w             . 
(14) 
22 2( ) ( ( 1 ) ) ( ) ( ( 1 ) )
rh f c r h f c
tx t u R t u R t lt w R t w R t uu u ww w              
(15) 
22 11
22 (( ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) (( ) ) ( ( 1 ) )
dr rh f c r r h f c










rh f c uR uR
tx t t t hf c
uu u
rhf c wR wR










     
               
    
           
. 






(( ) ) v a r ( ( 1 ) )




rr r h f c
uu x t u R t u Rt
rr r h f c








   
   
   









() ( 1 ) 1
( ) ( ( ) ) var( ) var( ) var( )
11 1
() ( 1 ) 1







rr r h f f uR uR
xu x t t t hf f
uu u

















     
               
     






    
. 
  Under the parameter assumptions of   0    and 0 1    , we find  0
r
u   ,  0
r









wl   .  From (17) and (18), it is then clear that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d




  Next consider the case in which there are no common shocks, but allow Home and Foreign to have 
different preference parameters and different parameters in the equations describing the stochastic processes 
for consumption. 
  With no common shocks, the equations for the stochastic discount factors simplify to: 
(19)  11 1
rh r h r hx r hl
tu t w t x t tl t t t mu w u w              
(20) 
** * * ** **
11 1
rf r f r f x r f l
tu t w t x t tl t t t mu w u w             
  We then find: 
(21) 
** rh rf r h r f
tu tu t w t w t uuww         
(22) 
2* 2 2 * 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
rh rf r h r f
tx tx t l tlt uuww        
(23) 
2* * 2 2 * * 2 11 1 1
22 2 2 ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
d r r h rr f r r h rr f
tu x t u x tw l t w lt ru uw w              
(24) 




hfh f xx l l





   
             
. 
  From these equations, we conclude: 
(25) 
2* * * 2 11
22
2* * * 2 11
22
cov( , ) ( ( ) )var( ) ( ( ) )var( )
(( ) ) v a r ( ) ( ( ) ) v a r ( )
dr r r h r r r f
tt u u x t u u x t
rr r h r r r f
ww l t w w l t
ru u
ww
     






2* * 2 11
22
2* 2
2* * 2 11
22
() ( )
cov(2 , ) ( ( ) )var( ) ( ( ) )var( )
11
() ( )
(( ) ) v a r ( ) ( ( ) ) v a r ( )
11
rr
dr r h r r f xx
tt u x t u x t hf
uu
rr
rr h r r f ll











        
 
       
. 
  Under the parameter assumptions of   0    and 0 1    , we find  0
r
u   ,  0
r









wl   .  Likewise, if 
* 0    and 
* 01    , then 
* 0
r
u   , 
* 0
r








wl   .  From (25) and (26), it is then clear that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   . 
 
Appendix to section 3.3: Examples with Preference Differences in which cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   
  It is clear from the previous proposition that we must introduce common shocks in order to account for 
cov( , ) 0
d
tt r  .   
Example 1 
One simple case is as in the model of Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) in which 
*
tt ll  , but unlike this paper, 
we now allow differences in preferences and parameters in the stochastic processes driving consumption.  In 
this case the equations for the stochastic discount factors simplify to   
  7
(27)  11 ()
rh c r h c x




rf c r f c x
tu t tx t t t t mu u u u         . 
  Then we have: 
(29) 
** ()
rh rf r r c
tu tu t uu t uu u        
(30) 
2* 2 2 * 2 2( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
rh rf r r c
tx tx t x xt uu u         
(31) 
2 * *2 2 * *2 11 1 1
22 2 2 ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
dr r h r r f r r r r c
tu x t u x t u x u x t ru u u                
(32) 




hf c xx x x





    
            
. 
 We  find: 
(33) 

2* * * 2 11
22
*2 * * 2 11
22
cov( , ) ( ( ) )var( ) ( ( ) )var( )
(( ) ) ( ( ) ) v a r ( )
dr r r h r r r f
tt u u x t u u x t
rrr r r r c
uu u x u x t
ru u
u
     
    
  




22 * 2 * * 2 11
22
2* 2 2 * * 2 11
22
var( ) var( )
c o v ( 2 , ) ( )( ( )) ( )( ( ))
11
var( )
() ( ) ( () )( ( ) )
1
hf
dr r r r r r tt
tt x u x x u x hf
uu
c
rr r r r r t









   

      
. 
  Under the parameter assumptions  0    and 0 1    , and 
* 0    and 
* 01    , we have found 
0
r
u   ,  0
r








wl   , and 
* 0
r
u   , 
* 0
r








wl   .  Examining equation (33), it is clear that we can find cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    if var( )
h
t u  and/or 
var( )
f
t u  are sufficiently large compared to var( )
c
t u , irrespective of the sign of the expression that multiplies 
var( )
c
t u . 
  Then, from equation (34), to find cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   , we need to have  
(35)   
2* 2 2 * * 2 11
22 ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
rr r r r r
xx u x ux          ,  
and 
c
u   sufficiently large relative to 
h
u   and 
f
u  .  To demonstrate that we can find a set of coefficients that 
gives us (35), assume without loss of generality that 
*     (which are both less than zero.)  Under these 
assumptions, 
2* 2 () ( ) 0
rr
xx   .  A necessary and sufficient condition for 
2* * 2 11
22 ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
rr r r
ux u x        is 
** (2 ) (2 )      .  These conditions then give us the inequality (35). 
  Note that the conditions 
*     and 
** (2 ) (2 )       imply that   must be small relative to 
*  .  
We have assumed the home country is less risk averse (
* 11     ), so it must also have a lower 







  Under these assumptions, suppose there is a decline in the common shock 
c
t u .  Since 
2* * 2 11
22 (( ) ) ( ( ) ) 0
rr r r
ux u x       , the Foreign interest rate rise relative to the Home interest rate (
d
t r  falls for 
positive values of 
c
t u ).  Because 
2* 2 () ( ) 0
rr
xx   , the risk premium on the Foreign bond (relative to the 
Home bond),  t  , must fall.  This is the opposite of the movements in relative interest rates and risk premium 
required to explain the cross-sectional portfolio results in Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2008). 
 
Example 2 
  Another example that can produce the result that cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    and cov( , ) 0
d
tt r    comes when we 
assume there are no idiosyncratic components.  Then the equations for the stochastic discount factors simplify 
to 
(36)  11 1
rc r c r cx r cl
tu t w t x t tl t t t mu w u w             . 
(37) 
** * * ** **
11 1
rc r c r c x r c l
tu t w t x t tl t t t mu w u w            . 




tu u tw w t uw       
(39) 
2* 2 2* 2 2 ( ( )() ) ( ( )() )
rr c rr c
tx x tl lt uw        
(40) 
2 * *2 2 * *2 11 11
22 22 ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
drr r r cr r r rc
tu x ux t w l wl t ruw                  
(41) 











      
. 
 We  find: 
(42)   

*2 * * 2 11
22
*2 * * 2 11
22
cov( , ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) var( )
(( ) ) ( ( ) ) v a r ( )
dr r r r r r c
tt u u u x u x t
rrr r r r c
ww w l w l t
ru
w
     
    
     





2* 2 2 * * 2 11
22
2* 2 2 * * 2 11
22
var( )
c o v ( 2 , )( )()( ( ) ) ( () )
1
var( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
1
c
dr rr r rr t
tt x x u x u x c
u
c
rr r r r r t









       
      
. 
  We will further assume that the persistence of consumption growth,  l  , in the Home country is equal 
to the persistence of consumption growth, 
*
l  , in the Foreign country, and 
*    , which imply 
*
ll    .   The 
only parameters that are different between Home and Foreign are the ones determining relative risk aversion 
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
*     and 
*    .  Under these assumptions, we can show 
that if cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   , we may still be able to derive a set of parameter restrictions that give us cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .    
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  Assume as in the previous example that that 
*     (which are both less than zero.)  Under these 
assumptions, 
2* 2 () ( ) 0
rr
xx   .  A necessary and sufficient condition for 
2* * 2 11
22 ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
rr r r
ux u x        is 
** (2 ) (2 )      .  Under these assumptions, as in the previous example, we then have 
 
2* 2 2 * * 2 11
22 ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
rr r r r r



















will have cov( , ) 0
d










  We need to show with these parameters that we can obtain cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  We will do this by 
showing  
*2 * * 2 11
22 ( ( )) ( ( ))
rrr r r r
ww w l w l            can be negative.  Then if var( )
c
t w  is sufficiently large 
relative to var( )
c
t u , we will have cov( , ) 0
d
tt r   .  (This latter condition then requires 
c
u   be greater than 
c
w   for 
the condition in the previous paragraph, 










, to hold.) 
  We can write: 
 
 
*2 * * 2 11
22
2
** * ** *
(( ) ) ( ( ) )
( ) () ( ) ()
4
rrr r r r
ww w l w l
l
    

         
    
         
. 
 
In order to get 
** * ** * ( ) () ( ) () 0                    , we need only find parameters (for 
example) such that  
 
** * () ( ) 0          
 
** * () ( ) 0         , 
and such that previous assumptions, 
* 0   , 01    , 
* 01    , and 
** (2 ) (2 )      , are satisfied.  
For example, 
* 1.5   ,  1    ,  0.1   , 
* 0.9    satisfy all of these conditions.  
 